A survey of municipal government ICT divisions during and after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami crisis reveals the need for creative responses to "beyond assumed level" disasters. Complexity and diversity of the damage were simply too great for any plans to assume. Resident needs toward municipal governments affected were also diverse and changed quickly as time went by. Our research also indicates that there would be ways to strengthen the capacity for effective spontaneous responses. Creative solutions executed during the 3/11 crisis were enabled by the existence of open source software available on the Net and by skilled engineers capable of exploiting them. Frugal information systems will be useful to improve preparedness for creative responses in the future.
Introduction
Six month after the devastating Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami of March 11, 2011, LASDEC (Local Authority Systems Development Center) requested Keio University to conduct a survey on how ICT (information and communication technology) systems and organizations coped during and after the crisis. The objective of the survey was to formulate a standard business continuity plan (ICT-BCP) for the local governments so they may be better prepared for future disasters. Structured interviews of 13 municipal governments in the hardest hit areas were conducted from November 2011 to January 2012. The data was supplemented by interviews of officials in other municipalities, which were conducted outside of the LASDEC study producing this paper.
Shortly after the fieldwork had started, however, researchers came to realize that the complexity and diversity of the damage was huge among the municipalities surveyed. In fact, so huge that it would have been unrealistic to expect that a single BCP will provide adequate preparation for all local governments. Diversity of resident needs toward municipal government services also varied greatly. This would have made the task even more complex.
Even if a comprehensive plan could have been drawn up, the cost of execution would have been prohibitive.
Based on our survey of the struggle of municipal governments to maintain critical resident life support services as well as the theoretical frameworks envisaged in public health crisis management literature such as Settle (1985) , the authors came to the notion of "preparedness for creative responses". We define creative responses in this paper as autonomous actions taken by local officials to deal with damage that was not assumed in disaster response plans.
We assert the usefulness of this notion based on our observation that many unplanned activities were necessary to cope with "beyond assumed level" situations, though such activities were assisted by a range of readily available tools. In summary, we assert that preparation for disaster should include both action plans for assumed events AND development of creative response capabilities to deal with damage beyond the assumed level.
We believe that the notion of "frugal IS" (Watson et al., 2012) will be helpful in preparing for creative responses to future crises in municipal government ICT systems. This paper consists of three main parts. The first part (Sections 2 and 3) gives an overview of the Great East Japan earthquake and an account of the extent, diversity and complexity of the damage and the need for progressive adaptation in handling them.
The second part (Sections 4 to 6) describes damage assumed in the regional disaster response plans that were drawn up prior to the crisis. This allows us to identify damage that fell inside as well as outside of prior assumptions. We then describe how the municipal governments tried to deal with events that were beyond these assumptions. We also review concepts and theories around disaster response plans and disaster preparedness. Then we analyze how ICT systems were operated and performed in the actual disaster situations. Cases of two kinds of resident support systems, one prepared before 3/11 and another developed ad-hoc after 3/11, are analyzed.
Based on case analyses in the second part of this paper, the third part (Sections 7 to 9) incorporates "flexibility" and "frugal" concepts in proposing future ICT development policies. The goal is to allow municipal governments to prepare for a creative response at times of crisis.
The Great East Japan Earthquake
The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred at 14:46 Japan Standard Time on March 11, 2011. Measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, it was the largest earthquake on record in Japan.
Prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake, the most destructive earthquake on record in Japan had been the Great Kanto Earthquake that hit the Kanto region including Tokyo on September 1, 1923, measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale. This earthquake left 104,619 people dead or missing, 190,000 buildings completely destroyed, and another 212,000 buildings burned according to data compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is generally estimated that it created 1.9 million evacuees. More recently, the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (7.3 on the Richter scale) on January 17, 1995, left 6,347 people dead or missing, 43,792 injured, 104,906 houses completely destroyed and another 534,780 houses partly destroyed (2006 Fire Defense Agency report).
A distinct characteristic of the 2011.3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake was, however, that tsunami damage was much greater than quake damage. Tsunami of up to 40 meters hit the coastline, devastating cities and towns. The Fire and Disaster Management Agency reported 16,131 deaths, 5,994 injuries and 3,240 missing as of January 2012. It also reported 128,497 houses totally lost and more than 900,000 partially destroyed.
The tsunami also destroyed all power supply to the cooling systems of the nuclear power plant in Fukushima causing a meltdown. As of January 1, 2012, 159,124 people from Fukushima had still not returned to their homes.
ICT divisions played an important support role in the recovery processes of all municipal governments. It would have been impossible to execute tasks without the support of ICT systems. ICT divisions were responsible for maintaining the infrastructure for various information systems.
ICT systems themselves were also hit. The interruption of communication and the loss of information system capabilities for operations were significant hindrances to the entire recovery process. People and organizations were deprived of the information and the processing capabilities necessary to deal with the situation. The effect was particularly noticeable at the municipal government level. There are 1742 municipal governments in Japan as of October 1. 2012. In the three-layer (national, prefectural and municipal) structure of Japanese government, municipal governments are closest to citizens and serving their daily needs directly.
Most significantly, municipal governments are in charge of keeping resident information which serves as the foundation for government.
Crisis diversity, complexity and progressive adaptation
Both the extent and the scale of the earthquake damage were diverse, as the damage was due to combinations of quake and tsunami impacts. The affected areas were also very large with different geographical conditions.
The expectations of ICT divisions and the requisites for and processes towards recovery varied greatly along several variables. The variables included structural damage to government facilities, server rooms and loss of data. There were severe doubts as to whether power supply and network connectivity could be resumed immediately and whether communication tools such as cell phones would remain functional during the crisis. Another unknown was the degree of mass emergency evacuation to locations outside the affected area.
Also notable was the need for progressive adaptation in the situation. As the situation changed over time, requirements for dealing with it also changed.
In the initial phase, immediate response measures in the municipalities that experienced major devastation focused on saving lives and guiding survivors to evacuation centers, with little priority given in some areas to reopening resident service counters (though there was a sense of urgency regarding the need for access to residents' personal information in order to facilitate rescue operations). Some ICT divisions even dispatched employees to do relief work, with just skeleton staff remaining at the office. At these municipalities as well, providing support to the affected people at various post-disaster stages was difficult without the use of ICT (including information systems). It became more than apparent that post-disaster expectations toward ICT divisions change as time passes.
Could a uniform plan be effective?

Planned response to assumed level damage
In general, regional disaster response plans drawn up by each municipality specify the scope of action to be taken by the relevant organization during a disaster, such as setting up disaster response headquarters and confirming the safety of residents. Some plans also clarify the role of each operational division in the event of a disaster.
After the disaster response headquarters were started up, many of the municipalities dispatched personnel for tasks such as operating evacuation centers and transporting goods under instructions from those headquarters. Further, although several of the regional disaster response plans stipulated that the role of ICT divisions during a disaster would be information services for the residents, this was not possible because key communication means were disrupted.
The response measures summarized below require a large number of people working at the disaster site to carry out numerous activities, including creating lists of survivor names and other information, manning resident service counters to issue Disaster Victim Certificates to qualify for disaster relief and other support systems, distributing relief money, accepting applications for temporary housing, and tearing down damaged buildings and clearing debris. Municipal governments are mandated by law to perform these tasks. ICT supports this role.
The disaster response measures taken by the ICT divisions of 13 municipalities surveyed can be primarily divided into the following: 1) Documenting evacuee names and other information (on paper and computer)
2) Restoring operation of information processing systems:
-Upgrade of existing systems -Development and introduction of new systems 3) Verifying information in various lists with previously documented resident information 4) Issuing of Disaster Victim Certificates Documenting personal information is an extremely labor-intensive task and though most of the municipalities made significant efforts to complete this unexpected post-disaster duty, employees found it extraordinarily demanding.
Damage beyond assumed level
Damage observed at the 13 municipal government office buildings following the earthquake and tsunami was well beyond assumed situations. Casualties and damage occurred in the form of --Loss of lives of majority of executives in the higher tier -Collapse of government office buildings -Damage to servers, ventilation systems and other equipment -Loss of data -Suspension of power supply Damage to telecommunications cables and equipment (disruption of communications) -Destruction of office automated systems -Difficulty in getting employees and other personnel to the government office building -Inability to enter the server room (malfunction of electronic locks due to power outage) -Relocation of the server room -Relocation of administrative functions In addition, in areas affected by the nuclear accident, access to the government offices became difficult for local and outside personnel despite no apparent damage to the buildings themselves. The difficulty of relocating data servers and administrative functions outside the region became increasingly apparent.
Post-disaster risks could potentially give rise to a number of adverse situations. In particular, a power failure will upset the operation of information processing systems and disrupt communication with the outside. Hence measures to ensure uninterrupted power supply are of utmost importance. During the survey as well, most of the municipal governments emphasized the need for a stable power supply. The time taken for commercial power supply to be resumed at the 13 government office buildings varied greatly by municipality, ranging from one day to several months. Although it may be close to impossible to anticipate the time required for power supply to be restored, measures must be implemented to clarify beforehand the tasks that must be carried out during a power failure and to create systems that will ensure uninterrupted power supply to essential ICT equipment. Initiatives must also be taken to prepare for other responses such as the relocation of some administrative functions in the event of prolonged power outages.
Response to beyond assumed events by ICT divisions
With regard to ICT divisions, however, none of the 13 municipalities surveyed had drawn up action plans that included business continuity planning. Also, responses by the respective ICT divisions at the time of the disaster were mainly based on their own discretion.
The following is a typical timeline of responses, produced on the basis of activities conducted by employees of ICT divisions at the municipalities that were surveyed in the months immediately following 3/11. Staff -1) checked the condition of the servers and other equipment in the server room immediately after disaster struck;
2) confirmed resident whereabouts, and helped with transporting goods and other tasks related to the operation of evacuation centers;
3) worked on restoring information processing systems, networks and other related equipment within the facility after power supply was resumed; 4) studied the introduction of and developed information processing systems that can be used for disaster response activities; 5) worked to restore public data networks in the region. Settle (1985) argued that emergency management should be financed in four stages, i.e., mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Shoaf et al. (2000) adopts the same four-stage model in the analysis of disaster management. In the context of this model, our research is about preparedness and response stages. We place added emphasis on preparedness for responses to damage that was not assumed before the event.
Plan vs. preparedness
An important aspect of preparedness is planning. Gebbie and Qureshi (2002) emphasized the importance of emergency response plans within the chain of command and with given agency roles. They also emphasized the importance of regular drills asserting that "plans that are never practiced or that are poorly understood will probably be useless". On the topic of drills, Watkins (2000) points out that FEMA (The Federal Emergency Management Agency) is adopting a five category model, i.e., orientation, drill, tabletop, functional, and full-scale.
As mentioned above, all of the 13 municipalities we interviewed in the LASDEC survey had regional disaster response plans. The plans defined the chain of command and the tasks to be performed. ICT divisions, however, were simply beyond the scope of the plans in spite of their importance. We are supportive of the national government initiative to equip all municipalities with ICT-BCP.
While we support better planning, our field research also revealed that the extent and diversity of damage can go far beyond any prior assumptions. This implies that even if ICT-BCP existed, a uniformly prepared set of responses would have been insufficient to meet the diverse and rapidly changing needs of the residents.
This by no means reduces the importance of planning. It is naturally useful to make predictions of damage and make plans to respond to the situation. Determination of the chain of command is critical and it is wise to stock up on supplies based on a careful estimation of need. Such plans should also be widely shared by all people concerned.
At the same time, we recognize the importance of flexibility in decision making in executing disaster management plans (Kunreuther and Miller, 1985) . To respond to changing situations, strategic incorporation of current information is essential.
We propose to apply the concept of preparedness when thinking about increased official capacity in flexible responses to unexpected events (See figure) .
In this regard, preparedness is at the opposite end of "plans" that are made based on predicted and assumed damage. Damage within assumptions can be dealt with by plans. What we need in addition is to prepare for the extra capacity required for creative responses to damage beyond the assumed level. The system operates in a series of steps:
Step1: Setting up resident identification.
Data was imported from City Government official resident records and can be searched as the key for subsequently adding records of advice.
Step2: Inputting resident problems.
Interview records of residents were input. We would like to verify the usefulness of this concept by applying it to the cases we observed in our survey. with open software on Linux. However it was stored in a locked area that was not openly accessible. It also required highly skilled engineers. Faced with technical requirements that the officials were not faced with on a daily basis, they tended to avoid using the system in the fear they might not be able to launch and support it.
Many municipalities that opted to avoid the Nishinomiya system also lacked the skill level of Tagajo City officials and instead relied on
Windows-based systems with package software such as Excel that was readily available.
Looking at above cases, it is important to incorporate flexibility into the building and operating of information systems to enable creative responses in emergency situations.
To this end, we may add a fifth U, i.e.
"ordinary usability". Ashenhurst (1972) makes the point that information systems should feature usability, operability, and maintainability to effectively fulfill users' needs.
Our survey confirms that it was far easier to fulfill usability criteria for systems that were used on an ordinary basis than for special purpose tools that were used infrequently. Thus we should try to use tools that we generally use, rather than applying special tools designed for extraordinary 
Conclusion
"Beyond assumed level" is a term that many Japanese heard almost every day in the days after the Fukushima nuclear plant accident following the tsunami. What became evident in that experience was that when you assume a certain extent of damage, you tend to forget preparing for damage beyond that level. We were unprepared for the worst tsunami in recorded history because we prepared assuming the previous worsts in our history. It is easy to argue that we should have prepared for even worse, but that would have been economically unrealistic. It will continue to be unrealistic to prepare for an infinite level of risks.
The Great East Japan Earthquake taught us that events beyond an assumed level do happen, and we should somehow deal with them creatively. What we need to do now is to train ourselves to be creative and prepare the kind of tools that support creativity effectively.
